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et al.: Remedies

REMEDIES
I.

"NEW BusiNEss RuLE" No LONGER A PER SE RULE OF
NONRECOVERABILITY OF LOST PROFITS

South Carolina has followed the "new business rule" regarding
damages for lost profits since the Supreme Court decided Standard
Supply v. Carter & Harris1 in 1908. The court announced the rule as
its holding, stating, "When a business is in contemplation, but not established or not in actual operation, profit merely hoped for is too uncertain and conjectural to be considered."2 In Drews Co. v. LedwithWolfe Associates,3 however, the court overruled Standard Supply,
holding that the new business rule no longer automatically precludes
recovery for lost profits for new businesses. 4 Instead, it is merely a rule
of evidentiary sufficiency.5 Courts now may award damages for lost
profits to owners of newly formed businesses if the owners are able to
show with reasonable certainty what future profits would have been.
The controversy in Drews arose out of a contract between the
Drews Company (contractor) and Ledwith-Wolfe Associates (owner)
under which the contractor was to renovate the owner's building for
use as a restaurant. Due to various differences between the two companies, the contractor pulled its workers from the project before it was
completed. The contractor then filed a mechanic's lien and sued to
foreclose. The owner counterclaimed, alleging the contractor's delays
caused the owner to lose profits from the restaurant. The jury awarded
the owner $14,000 in lost profits. The contractor, on appeal to the
South Carolina Supreme Court, claimed the trial court erred in awarding damages for lost profits, relying on the new business rule to preclude the award as too speculative.6
Several factors were important to the Drews court in its decision
to change its interpretation of the new business rule. The first was that
modern cases reflect a "willingness of [the South Carolina Supreme]
Court and our Court of Appeals to view the new business rule as a rule
of evidentiary sufficiency . . . . 7 The court indicated that in light of

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

81 S.C. 181, 62 S.E. 150 (1908).
Id. at 186-87, 62 S.E. at 152.
296 S.C. 207, 371 S.E.2d 532 (1988).
Id. at 212, 371 S.E.2d at 535.
Id.
Id. at 208-09, 371 S.E.2d at 533.
Id. at 210, 371 S.E.2d at 534.
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two decisions from the court of appeals and two from the supreme
court, the new business rule had eroded to such an extent that it was
no longer good law in this state.8 Of these cases, the best example of
the new business rule's erosion is John D. Hollingsworth on Wheels,
Inc. v. Akron Corp.9 Hollingsworth sought to apply the old version of
the new business rule to preclude an award of lost profits, asserting
that the damages claimed were too speculative. The court held that
although the damages claimed indeed were speculative, enough evidence existed to determine a reasonable amount for damages.10 Thus,
the court looked beyond the fact that this was a new business and focused instead on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Similarly, in Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co.,"' the court of appeals allowed damages for lost profits calculated on the basis of the business'
first three months of operation. Recovery was allowed because the
plaintiff was able to "present evidence from which the court [could]
make a 'fair and reasonable approximation'" of the damages. 2 In the
two remaining cases, Mali v. Odom's and Bryson v. Arcadian Shores,
Inc.," damages for lost profits were denied for the express reason that
the proof as to their amounts was insufficient and speculative. 5 Also
important in the development of the modern trend is South Carolina
Finance Corp. v. West Side Finance Co.' Decided in 1960, South Carolina Finance Corp. apparently was the supreme court's first indication that it would weigh the evidence in determining lost profits for
new businesses.'7 It is cited by most of the recent cases as precedent.

8. Id. at 210-11, 371 S.E.2d at 534 (relying on John D. Hollingsworth on Wheels,
Inc. v. Akron Corp., 279 S.C. 183, 305 S.E.2d 71 (1983); Bryson v. Arcadian Shores, Inc.,
273 S.C. 471, 257 S.E.2d 233 (1979); Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166 (Ct. App.
1988); Petty v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 288 S.C. 349, 342 S.E.2d 611 (Ct. App. 1986)).
9. 279 S.C. 183, 305 S.E.2d 71.
10. Id. at 187, 305 S.E.2d at 73.
11. 288 S.C. 349, 342 S.E.2d 611.
12. Id. at 355, 342 S.E.2d at 615 (quoting South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side
Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 125, 113 S.E.2d 329, 337 (1960)).
13. 295 S.C. 78, 367 S.E.2d 166.
14. 273 S.C. 471, 257 S.E.2d 233.
15. See Bryson, 273 S.C. at 476-77, 257 S.E.2d at 237 (appellant's proof of entitlement to set-off was too speculative to support award of recoupment); Mali, 295 S.C. at
84, 367 S.E.2d at 170 ("[E]stimates as to the anticipated monthly income and expenses
of the school were speculative, offered as they were without reference to any operational
history of the school or to any particular standard or fixed method for estimating future
income and expenses for a business of that kind.").
16. 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329 (1960).
17. The court in South CarolinaFin. Corp. found that "'it is sufficient if there is a
certain standard or fixed method by which profits sought to be recovered may be estimated and determined with a fair degree of accuracy.'" Id. at 123, 113 S.E.2d at 336
(quoting 15 AM. Jur.Damages § 150 (1938)).
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Together these cases represent the trend which culminated in the
Drews decision.
Another factor considered by the Drews court in its decision to
view the new business rule as one of evidentiary sufficiency was the
current multi-jurisdictional trend in that direction. Several out-of-state
cases cited in Drews demonstrate that other states readily accept application of the new business rule as a rule of evidentiary sufficiency.
For example, in S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Brothers ParkingWestern Corp.,1 the California Court of Appeal, in response to the
plaintiff's claim that lost profits for a new parking garage were too
speculative, stated, "The rule is, however, 'not a hard and fast one.'
The issue is, rather, whether the damages can be calculated with reasonable certainty." 19,
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, citing Kreedman and other cases,
adopted the modern interpretation of the new business rule in 1980 in
Chung v. Kaonohi Center Co.2 0 The court in Chung found sufficient
evidence to make a rational judgment as to lost profits from a newly
established Chinese restaurant.2 1 Additionally, in Smith Development
Corp. v. Bilow Enterprises,22 the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that profits lost as a result of tortious interference with a contract to
establish a McDonald's restaurant were sufficiently proven.23
It is difficult to distinguish between viewing the new business rule
as a per se bar to recoverability and viewing it merely as a rule of evidentiary sufficiency. For instance, even in Standard Supply Co., formerly the leading South Carolina case in applying the new business
rule, the court seemed to consider, at least to some extent, the sufficiency of the evidence. The case involved a cotton ginnery which, due
to the plaintiff's fault, was not able to resume operation during the
harvest season. Although the court stated that future profits of a business not currently in operation are too speculative, it went on to consider facts specific to a cotton ginnery and the reasons why such a busi2 5
24
ness cannot recover future profits. Likewise, in Currie v. Davis,

18. 58 Cal. App. 3d 173, 130 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).
19. Id. at 184, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (quoting Gerwin v. Southeastern Cal. Ass'n of
Seventh Day Adventists, 14 Cal. App. 3d 209, 92 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1971)) (citation
omitted).
20. 62 Haw. 594, 618 P.2d 283 (1980).
21. Id. at 606, 618 P.2d at 291.
22. 112 R.I. 203, 308 A.2d 477 (1973).
23. Id. at 214, 308 A.2d at 483.
24. See Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 187, 62 S.E. 150, 152
(1908). The court noted the special conditions of a cotton ginnery, stating:
A cotton giniery is in operation during the harvest season only, and conditions
are so liable to change from one season to another that the profit or loss of one
season is only one of several factors in estimating the probable results of the
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another of the old per se rule cases, the court gave evidentiary reasons
for denying recovery. 26 This suggests that South Carolina may have
been considering the evidence to some extent for many years, but that
businesses in the past were of the type less likely to be able to provide
sufficient evidence for recovery. The court's decision in Drews is supported by this observation.
Now that the new business rule is redefined in South Carolina so
that it both reflects the modern trend nationally and completes the
development of state law in this area, one wonders what sort of evidence will be considered sufficient to allow recovery of future profits.
The most obvious example of facts sufficient to prove future profits is
evidence that can be proffered by a franchise. The uniformity of procedures and training at franchises as well as the fact that other units of
the franchise are often2 7 in the immediate area tends to provide a basis
for concrete evidence.

Another type of business that might easily provide acceptable evidence is a bank or finance company. 28 The rationale offered for the
California Court of Appeal's decision in Kreedman shows that businesses that are very simple in nature might also be allowed to recover
future profits. 20 In South Carolina the court has shown that it will not
award future profits, however, unless it is presented with evidence of
the "operational history of the [business] or [of] any particular standard or fixed method for estimating future income and expenses." 3
Thus, these factors seem to comprise threshold requirements in determining evidentiary sufficiency.
The supreme court's decision in Drews was a logical step for South
Carolina to have taken in the area of damages to new business. In rede-

next; and, therefore, profit which the defendants hoped to make in the season
of 1906 is too uncertain and speculative as to the .measure of damages.

Id.
25. 130 S.C. 408, 126 S.E. 119 (1923).
26. See id. at 414, 126 S.E. at 121 ("There is no evidence as to local or special
conditions tending to establish that as a result of the delay in opening any business was
actually diverted to other plants, or that plaintiff's output as a whole for the season was
in any wise diminished."). Id.
27. See Smith Dev. Corp. v. Bilow Enters., 112 R.I. 203, 213, 308 A.2d 477, 483

(1973).
28. See South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 123-24, 113
S.E.2d 329, 336 (1960).

29. See S. Jon Kreedman & Co. v. Meyers Bros. Parking-Western Corp., 58 Cal.
App. 3d at 186, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49 ("[T]he operation of a parking garage is a relatively
simple operation with sufficiently few decision points to make a prediction of profits

reasonably possible.").
30. Mali v. Odom, 295 S.C. 78, 84, 367 S.E.2d 166, 170 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing

South Carolina Fin. Corp., 236 S.C. at 123, 113 S.E.2d at 336).
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fining the new business rule as a rule of evidentiary sufficiency rather
than an automatic bar to recovery, the court has brought South Carolina in line with the national trend without changing the direction in
which the state's common law has been moving since 1908.
Laura E. Zoole
II.

PLAINTIFFS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT BETWEEN CONSISTENT CAUSES
OF ACTION PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO JURY

In Franke Associates v. Russel 3 1 the South Carolina Supreme
Court addressed whether a trial court may force a plaintiff to elect between two causes of action before the case is submitted to a jury. The
court held that in this case the trial judge erred when he required the
plaintiff to make an election.3 2
The case involved complicated facts. Fred Smith and Harold Simmons, general partners of Smith, Simmons & Associates, wished to develop a warehouse, the Franke Building, into an office condominium
complex. They planned to create Franke Associates, a limited partnership, to purchase the building and sell the office condominium units. In
November 1983 Robert Russell negotiated with Smith and Simmons
for the sale of three office condominium units. Instead of paying the
purchase price of $660,000 to Franke Associates, the parties restructured the deal so that Russell would acquire directly from Smith, Simmon & Associates an individual 25 percent interest in the Franke
Building for $660,000. Russell then transferred his interest in Franke
Associates in return for three office condominiums. The parties also
agreed that Russell would pay an additional $210,750 to Franke
Associates.3
On December 27, 1984, Russell acquired title to the condominiums. Subsequently, Franke Associates demanded that Russell pay an
additional $750,000 for the cost of renovating the office condominium
units. Russell claimed that his agreement fixed his price at $870,750,
the amount stated on his deed. Franke Associates contended that Russell agreed to pay the additional $750,000 for the renovations. As a result, Franke Associates brought suit to recover renovation expenses.3"
In its complaint Franke Associates stated causes of action based
on breach of contract and quantum meruit. 35 Before trial Russell

31. 295 S.C. 327, 368 S.E.2d 462 (1988).
32. Id. at 331, 368 S.E.2d at 464.

33. Id. at 328-29, 368 S.E.2d at 462-63.
34. Id.

35. Id. at 328, 368 S.E.2d at 462-63. The complaint also stated a cause of action
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moved to require Franke Associates to elect between the breach of contract claim and the quantum meruit claim. The motion was denied.
Prior to closing argument, however, Russell again moved to force election and this time the motion was granted.36 The trial judge indicated
he was requiring the election only because of the complicated nature of
the case in an effort to minimize jury confusion, which could result
37
from extensive jury instructions.
Franke Associates elected to proceed on the breach of contract action. The jury returned a verdict for Russell, denying recovery to
Franke Associates. Franke Associates then brought this appeal, claiming the trial judge erred in requiring the election. 8
The supreme court held that requiring the election between
breach of contract and quantum meruit was error.3 9 The court reasoned that election is required only when two claims are inconsistent,
and that the breach of contract and the quantum meruit claims were
alternative, rather than inconsistent. The court stated that because the
two claims were based upon identical facts, they were not inconsistent.
Inconsistency, the court noted, would be present only "if [an] appellant were to prevail under both causes of action for a single injury and
double recovery were permitted."'4 0
The court took into consideration that evidence needed to prove
the two causes of action was interrelated and that the plaintiffs themselves were uncertain as to the proper remedy.41 Franke Associates introduced contractual documents in an attempt to show an express contract, but conceded that due to the modifications and restructuring of
the transaction, the jury could have found no express agreement as to
42
the price of the renovations existed.
Franke Associates presented the court with its first opportunity to
review a trial court's order requiring a plaintiff to elect remedies between the close of evidence and submission of the case to the jury. The
decision is in accord with a recent line of South Carolina Court of Appeals cases addressing election of remedies.4 3 Based on those cases and
based on a mechanic's lien, but this claim was disposed of in favor of Russell on summary judgment. Id.
36. Id. at 330, 368 S.E.2d at 464.

37. Id. at 330 n.1, 368 S.E.2d at 464 n.1.
38. Id. at 330, 368 S.E.2d at 463.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 332, 368 S.E.2d at 465.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Adams v. Grant, 292 S.C. 581, 358 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1986); Harper v.
Ethridge, 290 S.C. 112, 348 S.E.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1986); Save Charleston Found. v. Murray, 286 S.C. 170, 333 S.E.2d 60 (Ct. App. 1985); H.G. Hall Constr. Co. v. J.E.P. Enters.,
283 S.C. 196, 321 S.E.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1984); Robert Harmon and Bore, Inc. v. Jenkins,
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Franke Associates, the current trend favors permitting the plaintiff to
pursue as many claims as the evidence supports and the courts reasonably can adjudicate.
Cases on election of remedies usually involve pretrial motions.
Courts generally have disfavored such motions unless the causes of action involved were determined to be inconsistent. The test to determine inconsistency requires one to focus on the causes of action set
forth in the complaint. They are inconsistent when they are "'so inherently repugnant

. . .

that the assertion of one necessarily constitutes

an election, and precludes an assertion of the other.' "44 Thus, in
Thompson v. Watts45 a cause of action seeking rescission of a contract
was inconsistent with a cause of action for affirmance of the contract
46
and actual and punitive damages arising from its breach.
While this case limits the instances in which election may be required for the sake of simplification for juries, restrictions still exist. If
courts deem the causes of action to be inconsistent, a requirement to
elect still may be proper. Furthermore, the court may require an election between legal and equitable claims before trial because of the differing types of trial and proof involved.47 If the claims involve the same
types of proof, however, and are not "so repugnant. . . that the assertion of one necessarily constitutes an election, and precludes an assertion of the other, ' 48 the plaintiff apparently cannot be forced to choose
between claims.
The court's holding in Franke Associates is consistent with holdings from other jurisdictions that have considered the issue. 49 Furthermore, Franke Associates is basically an extension of the court of appeals' decision in Robert Harmon and Bore, Inc. v. Jenkins," which
established the rule that causes of action for quantum meruit and
breach of contract are not inconsistent and that plaintiffs will not be
required to choose between the two prior to trial. Consequently, the
case cannot be said to have made any drastic departures from estab-

282 S.C. 189, 318 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1984).
44. Jenkins, 282 S.C. at 197, 318 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Tzouvelekas v.
Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. 90, 94, 33 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1945)).

45. 281 S.C. 504, 316 S.E.2d 393 (1984).
46. Id. at 507, 316 S.E.2d at 395. But see Jenkins, 282 S.C. at 198, 318 S.E.2d at
376 (court of appeals holding causes of action on express contract and in quantum meruit not inconsistent and thus no election required).
47. See Harper, 290 S.C. 112, 348 S.E.2d 374.
48. Jenkins, 282 S.C. at 197, 318 S.E.2d at 376 (quoting Tzouvelekas, 206 S.C. at
94, 33 S.E.2d at 74).
49. See, e.g., In re King Enters., 678 F.2d 73 (1982); Benn v. McBride, 140 Ga.
App. 698, 231 S.E.2d 438 (1976) (no election required between breach of contract and
quantum merit causes of action).
50. 282 S.C. 189, 318 S.E.2d 371 (Ct. App. 1984).
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lished principles. Instead, Franke Associates is significant because it
makes clear that a plaintiff who cannot be forced to elect causes of
action before trial cannot be required to do so before the case is submitted to the jury.
The court's holding in Frank Associates v. Russell is the correct
one if cases are to be decided on merit instead of procedure. Plaintiffs
should have the right to submit for consideration as many theories of
recovery as they believe in good faith are applicable. Practical restrictions will prevent the opportunity from being abused. Additionally,
South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 11 requires attorneys to plead
only those causes of action they believe in good faith are justified."
Finally, the decision in Franke Associates will not lead to the assertion
of excessive and unwarranted causes of action because plaintiffs cannot
escape the need for credibility with the jury, which surely will be called
into question if numerous, inconsistent claims are presented.
William H. Johnson

51. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 11.
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